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Determinants of efficiency in child care provision 
Abstract 
 
This article analyzes the efficiency in the provision of child care services at the 
municipal level and identifies the main determinants of inefficiency. We use a unique 
data set on the local child care expenditures in the eastern German State of Saxony. The 
analysis is performed in two stages. First, we measure the efficiency by using a Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Second, we consider political, fiscal and demographic 
variables in a truncated regression to identify the determinants of inefficiency. We find 
substantial differences in efficiency; the median municipality is up to 28% inefficient in 
expenditures on child care. Explanatory variables such as an uncompensated mayor or a 
larger share of over 65-year olds significantly increases inefficiency. 
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Universal access to child care is welfare-enhancing. Through public child care provision
governments can encourage both female labor market participation [Heckman (1974),
Gustafsson and Staﬀord (1992)] and fertility [Björklund (2006), Del Boca (2002)]. In
addition child care also has a positive inﬂuence on the children’s future performance
[Currie and Thomas (1995), Spiess et al. (2003), Waldfogel (2002)].
Whereas family policy is a national issue, the provision of child care is usually delegated
to the local level. Given heterogeneities in the size and socio-demographic structure of
municipalities, diﬀerences in the municipal expenditure decisions are to be expected. A
municipality that is more eﬃcient in the allocation of its resources may thus be able to
provide more child care services with the same resources than a comparable, less eﬃcient
municipality. Eﬃciency in public expenditure is generally desirable. However, in the
expansion of child care services the eﬃcient use of the scarce resources is of particularly
importance.
Since achieving eﬃciency implies a reduction in costs without a loss in provision levels,
eﬃciency analysis has become an important instrument in investigating (municipal) ex-
penditures.1 In spite of the obvious importance of the child care sector, only few studies
have attempted to analyze its eﬃciency. To our knowledge, the only study that analyzes
the eﬃciency of child care centers is Bjurek et al. (1992). They investigate the eﬃciency
of expenditures of child care facilities in the city region of Gothenburg in Sweden. Using
data on the facility level they ﬁnd potential output gains of about 10 to 15%, and that
1In recent years the studies analyzing local government eﬃciency have expanded. Some authors have
considered the overall eﬃciency of the local public sector, such as De Borger and Kerstens (1996)
Belgian local government, Sampaio de Sousa and Stosic (2005) Brazilian municipalities, Worthington
(2000) Australian local government, Geys (2006) and Geys and Moesen (2009) Flemish municipalities
and Afonso and Fernandes (2008) Portuguese local government (see also the last mentioned for a more
comprehensive survey of relevant literature). However, since the deﬁnition of the appropriate output
variables is diﬃcult it may be advisable to only consider a narrow aspect of public goods, i.e. one
speciﬁc activity [Pestieau (2009)]. Therefore others focus on the provision of speciﬁc services such
as police protection [Drake and Simper (2003)], public libraries [Hemmeter (2006)], street-lighting
[Lorenzo and Sánchez (2007)], county roads [Kalb (2008)] or public schools [Millimet and Collier
(2008)].
2centers in more aﬄuent areas and ones with a more experienced director are more eﬃ-
cient.2 Since we consider municipalities instead of the individual facilities, the factors that
inﬂuence eﬃciency are not directly comparable to those considered here. Beyond child
care, in the broader ﬁeld of public education, numerous contributions have conducted
eﬃciency analyses. Grosskopf et al. (2001) ﬁnd no evidence of increased eﬃciency in
public schools when faced with competition from private schools. However, when the
strategic interaction between neighbouring school districts is controlled for, competition
and a reduction in ineﬃciency are found [Millimet and Collier (2008)]. Furthermore,
Millimet and Collier (2008) stress the importance of the school district as the ﬁnancier
of education as the correct level of analysis as opposed to the schools. Analoguously we
analyze the eﬃciency of municipalities that ﬁnance child care centers.
First, we evaluate the eﬃciency of the municipalities in the provision of child care
services. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬃciency reserves, but diﬀerences between the municipalities
are large. In the average municipality provision could be increased by about 20-30%.
Second, we use economic and socio-demographic variables to explain the diﬀerences in
eﬃciency. In particular, a lack of professionalism of the mayor and a larger share of the
elderly population have a negative impact on the eﬃciency, whereas the number of child
care facilites in a given municipality has a positive impact.
This contribution is structured as follows: section 2 presents both the methods of
eﬃciency analysis, as well as the second stage regression. In section 3 we introduce the
data and discuss the results of the eﬃciency analysis. The variables used in the second
stage and results of the regression are discussed in section 4. The ﬁnal section 5 concludes
with a discussion and policy implications.
2The results they obtain in the second stage eﬃciency determination analysis are to be viewed with
caution. Methodological developments in recent years have shown that the adopted Tobit speciﬁca-




Generally eﬃciency analysis is concerned with the measurement of an organization’s abil-
ity to use its inputs to produce outputs. In the eﬃciency analysis literature, mainly two
methods have been employed: the non-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
and the parametric Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA).
Both the parametric and non-parametric methods have their advantages and disad-
vantages. The primary beneﬁt of using a stochastic approach is that a deviation from
the frontier can be disaggregated into either ineﬃciency or stochastic diﬀerences between
the units under consideration. Contrarily, in DEA all deviation is considered ineﬃciency.
The major advantage of the non-parametric approaches lies in the ﬂexibility to model
multiple inputs and outputs when prices are not available. When using SFA either a cost
or a production function has to be estimated. Nonetheless a speciﬁc functional form still
has to be chosen a priori. Since the form of the production function is not obvious when
considering public units, it is in this case preferable to employ non-parametric methods
where assumptions need only to be made with regard to the properties of the points in
the production set (disposability, proportionality or convexity) [Pestieau (2009)].
Although the methods of eﬃciency analysis are derived from productivity analysis
of private enterprises, some clear distinctions exist when considering production in the
public sector. When competitive ﬁrms are analyzed, the prices of inputs and outputs can
be used to aggregate inputs and/or outputs in the eﬃciency estimation. However, when
the analysis is concerned with public sector productivity, the inputs and outputs are often
not sold on the private market, and therefore price information cannot be employed in
aggregation. For these reasons the nonparametric method has been prevalent among
studies considering the public sector. In our study the eﬃciency will also be evaluated
according to a DEA accounting for variable returns to scale.
Due to the well-known diﬃculties in deﬁning inputs and outputs for public goods,
4the method of eﬃciency analysis is not beyond critique [Pestieau (2009)]. The risk of a
misspeciﬁcation of the eﬃcient frontier can be reduced by two means. Firstly, the more
narrowly the public service is deﬁned, the more closely appropriate inputs and outputs
can be matched to the service. Secondly, testing diﬀerent combinations of inputs and
outputs increases the reliability of the speciﬁed eﬃcient frontier.
2.2. Data envelopment analysis (DEA)
Data envelopment analysis is a mathematical programming technique for measuring rel-
ative eﬃciency of similar production units (in this case municipalities). The frontier or
envelope is constructed from empirically observable points. The input-output relation
yields an eﬃciency score where the fully eﬃcient units can be regarded as best-practice
units.
In the application of a DEA, the eﬃciency of the units in the sample are assessed in two
steps. In the ﬁrst step, a frontier is generated based on those observations that use the
lowest mix of inputs to produce their outputs (input orientation), or alternatively those
observations that achieve the highest mix of outputs given the level of inputs (output
orientation). The choice of the orientation depends on the objective or the dimension
in which the policy-maker is believed to have more discretion [Worthington and Dollery
(2000) and Fried et al. (2008)].3 In the second step, each observation is compared to the
piece-wise linear surface of the eﬃcient observations derived in the ﬁrst step, and then
each is assigned an eﬃciency score. By solving a distinct linear program for each unit the
eﬃciency of each is maximized by ﬁnding the best possible weights of inputs and outputs.
The procedure is constrained by the condition that when all units receive the weights
that maximize their respective eﬃciency none may receive an eﬃciency score greater
than 1. Generally all weights are non-negative, and no set of other weights will render
a higher eﬃciency. Thus the frontier is the set of eﬃcient units “enveloping” those that
3Refer to section 3.4 for a detailed discussion of the results obtained from both the input and output
orientations.
5are not as eﬃcient. The calculated frontier has the dimensions of the sum of inputs and
outputs. In other words, in DEA eﬃciency is deﬁned as the ratio of the weighted sum of
outputs divided by the weighted sum of inputs of a given unit. The ineﬃciency of a unit
is then the distance from the eﬃcient surface, or its input-output ratio in comparison to
the units that lie on the surface. Ineﬃciency (in input orientation) is how much a unit
could reduce inputs while still achieving the current output level.4
The problem below formally describes the envelopment form of the input oriented




s:t:  yi + Y   0;
xi   X  0
N10 = 1
  0:
 is a scalar and is the eﬃciency score of the i-th unit.   1, where a value 1 indicates a
technically eﬃcient unit that lies on the frontier. A set of N municipalities, use M inputs
and generate S outputs. Then for the i-th municipality the known inputs and outputs
are represented by the vectors xi and yi respectively. For all N units the input matrix
X has the dimensions (M  N) and the output matrix Y is represented by an (S  N)
matrix.  is a (N 1) vector of constraints, and N1 is an (N 1) vector of ones.5 Thus
a convex hull that envelopes the data points is constructed as described above.
The information contained in the computed eﬃciency scores shed only limited light on
4In the output orientation: how much it could increase its output while not employing more inputs.
5If constant returns to scale (CRS) are assumed, the model is computed without the convexity constraint
N1
0 = 1 according to Charnes et al. (1978). The CRS speciﬁcation is only valid when all units are
operating on the eﬃcient scale. When this is not the case, a variable returns to scale speciﬁcation is
more appropriate. The diﬀerence between the two models is illustrated for the one input one output
case in appendix section A, and we test the scale eﬃciency in section 3.4.
6the sources of ineﬃciency. Therefore a two-stage approach to analyze the factors that
inﬂuence the eﬃciency scores beyond the direct production process may be of interest.
Traditionally the decision making units (DMUs) are treated as a black box turning inputs
into outputs at diﬀerent levels of eﬃciency [Fried et al. (2008)]. However, recently the
methods for conducting a statistically sound explanatory analysis have contributed to
attempts at identifying the sources of (in-)eﬃciency. One way is to regress the eﬃciency
scores on a set of explanatory variables in a second stage. Factors that inﬂuence the
eﬃciency (explanatory variables) beyond the direct production process are regressed on
the eﬃciency scores from the ﬁrst stage to describe the conditions that are more and
less suitable for eﬃcient outcomes. The set of explanatory variables used in this study
is discussed in section 4.
2.3. Second stage regression analysis: Estimation procedure
Most contributions that apply some form of eﬃciency or productivity analysis go beyond
an estimation of eﬃciency scores and employ multiple methods and speciﬁcations as
sensitivity checks. Some also seek to explain the diﬀerences in eﬃciency in a second
stage regression. Although considering exogenous variables directly in an SFA is generally
unproblematic, the naive regression of DEA eﬃciency scores in a two-stage approach is
to be viewed critically [Fried et al. (2008), Simar and Wilson (2007)]. However, once the
serial correlation of the eﬃciency scores is accounted for by an appropriate bootstrapping
procedure, the use of a second stage regression becomes legitimate. When it is not
possible to deﬁne an appropriate production or cost function for an SFA (as is the case
for child care provision), then a two-stage semi-parametric analysis is clearly preferable.
The regression analysis here follows the procedure proposed by Simar and Wilson
(2007). The basis of a two-stage approach is the assumption that the DMUs face certain
environmental variables (z) that constrain their choices of inputs (x) and outputs (y).
In other words, the variables in z inﬂuence the mean and the variance of the ineﬃciency
7process, but do not inﬂuence the production process itself.6 Formally the observations
stem from the set Sn = (xi;yi;zi)
n
i=1, where xi and yi are the inputs and outputs used
in the i-th unit (municipality) to derive the eﬃciency (o) of each of the n observa-
tions in the previous section. Additionally the observations are characterized by certain
environmental or exogenous variables, contained in the vector zi.
The problems that arise when conducting a naive second stage regression include a slow
convergence of the estimated parameters towards the true values when more than one
input and output are included as well as serial correlation of an unknown form between
the eﬃciency scores and the explanatory variables. Moreover, a change in one eﬃciency
score can change the whole frontier, since the eﬃciency of a unit is dependent on all
other units. The fact that several eﬃciency scores equal one may suggest a censoring at
the probability mass of 1. Some authors therefore use a Tobit speciﬁcation in the second
stage regression [among others Bjurek et al. (1992), De Borger and Kerstens (1996),
Kirjavainen and Loikkanen (1998), Worthington and Dollery (2001)]. However, since
an eﬃciency score cannot exceed 1, the dependent variable is in fact truncated and not
censored. Therefore a truncated regression is more appropriate, and has also been shown
to perform better in simulations [Simar and Wilson (2007)].
In the input orientation the dependent variable (the inverse of the eﬃciency score)
is obtained by the input distance function and hence  = (1;1) [Shephard (1970)].
The eﬃciencies (i) are in this case computed within the production possibilities (P)
according to:
i = (xi;yijP)
with the Banker et al. (1984) assumption of variable returns to scale.
The model we estimate is the following: ^ i = zi + i  1, where  are the pa-
rameters to be estimated and  is the error term. Since the true  is not observable,
6For example, a municipality’s source of revenues, whether from taxes or transfers, does not inﬂuence
the production of child care but may inﬂuence the incentives to use the resources eﬃciently.
8values corresponding to ^  were computed in the ﬁrst stage and subsequently used in the
analysis. Clearly since ^ i is derived from xi and yi, it will also be correlated with zi.
Therefore a bootstrap procedure to correct for serial correlation is necessary in the max-




i are drawn from the density ^ f(x;y;z). We follow the algorithm
suggested by Simar and Wilson (2007).7
3. Empirical eﬃciency analysis
Municipalities have a set of resources (inputs) at their disposal with which they pro-
duce the required services (i.e. outputs). The municipalities that are relatively eﬃcient
determine the frontier to which the ineﬃcient municipalities are compared. Since a mu-
nicipality uses multiple inputs in the production of its outputs, the DEA provides a useful
means of assessing eﬃciency. In the next section the data employed in the analysis is
presented. Since it is not a priori clear whether the municipalities choose to adjust the
inputs (expenditures) or the level of output (amount of child care services), we also test
the orientation of the process.
3.1. Data and sample
We use cross sectional data for the year 2006 which pertain to the municipalities in the
state of Saxony in Germany. In that year, the state had a total of 496 municipalities.
About two-thirds (332) of all municipalities have a population of less than 5000 and there
are only three larger cities.8 In total 214.361 children were cared for in either public or
non-proﬁt facilities. However, municipality speciﬁc data on child care provision is only
recorded for 282 municipalities [State Oﬃce of Statistics of Saxony (2008b)]. Municipal-
ities with less than three individual child care providers are not disclosed in the statistic,
7Speciﬁcally we use Algorithm #1 with the suggested L=2000 replications, p. 41.
8Leipzig with 506,578, Dresden with 504,795 and Chemnitz with 245,700 inhabitants.
9therefore many small municipalities are disqualiﬁed from the analysis but the remaining
sample is more homogeneous. Non-parametric approaches are very sensitive to outliers,
therefore it is important that potential outliers are removed from the sample. First mu-
nicipalities that have less than three facilities cannot be included in the analysis. Second,
observations that contain missing values in any of the potential inputs or outputs are
excluded. Finally the outlier detection procedure proposed by Wilson (1993) is applied to
eliminate additional inﬂuential observations. Ultimately a sample of 213 municipalities
remains.9
In child care we distinguish between three distinct groups: the under 3 year olds, the
3-6 year olds and 6-12 year old participants in after school programs. The youngest of
the three groups accounts for 13.8% of all children receiving care, the group of 3-6 year
olds forms the largest group with 47.5% and 38.8% of children in child care are above
the age of 6.10 The diﬀerences in care intensity between the three groups are apparent
in terms of the legally deﬁned child-to-personnel ratio. For the youngest group one care
person may assume responsibility over no more than 6 children, for the middle group the
ratio is 1:10 and 1:18 for the group of the oldest children. In other words, the amount
of personnel is dependent on the age structure of the children in care. Thus, even if
relativley few under 3 year olds attend child care, the per child costs will be higher for a
municipality.
If a parent is interested in child care for his or her child, there are three diﬀerent types
of child care services one can choose from. Type I contains all non-proﬁt governmental
(public) care centers. The non-proﬁt non-governmental (e.g. the welfare organizations of
the evangelical and catholic churches) centers deﬁne Type II. The municipalities subsidize
the Type II providers for the number of places they oﬀer. The ﬁnal category, Type III,
9Of the sample of 282 municipalities with more than 3 facilities, for 226 observations the data on all
inputs and outputs is available, after which 13 of the remaining sample are labeled as outliers.
10In the group of above 6 year olds, the aggregate statistic at the state level includes cohorts up to the
age of 12. However from the population statistic at the municipal level we are only able to distinguish
the age group as 6 to 10 year olds. Since the number of 10 and 11 year olds attending child care after
school is relatively small, we use the population statistics on the 6-10 year olds.
10are private for-proﬁt child care centers. Type III facilities must cover their operating
costs solely through tuition.11 Most children who attend child care in Saxony do so
either at Type I (1365 or 52%) or Type II (1257 or 48%) centers. Since we are interested
in municipal expenditure eﬃciency and the municipalities may organize the required
number of child care places either in fully public facilities (Type I) or through the non-
proﬁt providers (Type II), our focus is on the facilities of Type I and II.
3.2. Inputs and outputs
Expenditure variables that pertain to the provision of municipal child care services are
plausible inputs. We only consider current expenditures (material costs and personnel),
investment expenses do not enter the analysis. We exclude investment entirely to avoid
distortions from one-time ﬁxed costs. Instead we are interested in the regularly accruing
costs from providing the service.
In some municipalities the provision of child care is also partially provided by Type II
(non-proﬁt) organizations that receive transfers from the municipality. These transfers
are added to the expenditures for materials recorded for the Type I (public) facilities.
Together these costs enter the analysis as the ﬁrst input called “material expenditures”.12
Personnel expenditures are only recorded for the employees of the Type I centers. There-
fore we do not include the personnel expenditures in the analysis. Instead the combined
personnel (number of employed persons) in both Type I and Type II centers is included
as the second input. Since the wages of the child care employees in Type I (public) and
Type II (non-proﬁt) centers are regulated, the aggregation should not introduce a bias.
The second input is thus “personnel”.
11The attendance in fully private facilities is not recorded separately in the oﬃcial statistics. However,
most of these are located in one of the large agglomerations and are therefore excluded from our
analysis.
12Although the funds transfered to the Type II centers are included in the material expenditures, we
cannot know whether these funds are solely used for materials or if some are also used to pay personnel.
However, since the transfer payments account for less than 5% of all material expenditures and since
only 10% of the municipalities in our sample engage in transfer payments, the potential bias is
marginal.
11Variable Mean St. Dev. Min. Max.
Inputs
Material expenditures (in e) (x1) 218037 193119 1584 1308953
Personnel # persons (x2) 41 32 9 171
Facility densitya (x3) 0.15 0.13 0.02 0.90
Outputs
assigned places (y1) 397.50 297.70 103 1589
weighted under 3 year oldsb (y2) 72.29 59.84 11.03 336.36
weighted 3-6 year olds (y3) 147.60 113.90 17.76 589.35
weighted 6-10 year olds (y4) 133.75 98.52 23.52 549.47
aFacilities per km
2
bNumber of under 3 year olds times the county share of children under 3 receiving child care. The
corresponding calculation was performed for the weighing of the other age groups.
Table 1: Summary statistics of inputs and outputs
The third input considered is “facility density” and is measured as the number of centers
divided by the municipal area in square kilometers. Since the municipalities can control
how many facilities they operate, this variable accounts for size diﬀerences and diﬀerences
in ﬁxed costs from having multiple units. The potential inputs are summarized in the
top section of Table 1.
The outputs are determined by the amount of service demanded. Since in the year
2006 only children above the age of 3 until school age (6 year olds) had a legal claim
to a place in a child care facility, this group forms the largest group for whom services
need to be produced. Two additional fractions remain, namely those above the age of 6
who receive after school care, and those below the age of 3. On the one hand, children
under the age of 3 require signiﬁcantly more supervision than older children and therefore
care for this relatively small group is still costly and should also enter the analysis as an
output. On the other hand, school age children above the age of 6 form the third large
group and constitute 35% of children receiving care in public child care facilites. The
state-wide average share of children enrolled in child care varies signiﬁcantly betweeen
the three age groups. Of all under 1 year olds only 3% were in child care in 2006, of 1 to
3 year olds 45.4%, of 3 to 6 year olds 92.6% and of 6 to 10 year olds 67.2%.
12Data on the number of children receiving child care services disaggregated by the age
of the child is not available. Therefore the potential output variable is limited to the total
number of assigned places (i.e. the legally allowed capacity aggregated for all age groups
in a given municipality), which may mask the diﬀerences in care intensity between the
age groups. In two speciﬁcations the variable “assigned places” is the sole output.
To better account for the diﬀerences in the three age groups we construct a weighted
output proxy. The county speciﬁc shares of children in each of the three age groups
receiving care can be used to construct a demand index.13 The shares are multiplied
by the number of children in each age group in a particular municipality. These three
indices, “weighted under 3 year olds”, “weighted 3-6 year olds” and “weighted 6-10 year
olds”, are then used as outputs in two alternative speciﬁcations. The summary statistics
of the potential outputs are found in the bottom half of Table 1.
The variable returns to scale DEA is conducted for four diﬀerent speciﬁcations.14 The
four models that result from the diﬀerent input-output combinations are summarized in
Table 2. Models A and B only contain the two inputs on “materials” and “personnel”,
whereas models C and D contain the additional input on “facility density”. With regard
to the diﬀerent output combinations models A and C only contain one output, namely
the number of “assigned places”. The “weighted number of children” in the three relevant
age groups constitute the outputs in models B and D.
3.3. Quality Considerations
The great diﬃculty in eﬃciency analyses is that output quality cannot be controlled for,
since variables that describe quality are hard to deﬁne. This could be seen as a potential
shortcoming when considering such a sensitive area of publicly provided goods as child
care services. However, in this case this aspect does not jeopardize the analysis due to the
13We must resort to the ﬁgures at the county level since the corresponding data is not made available
for the municipalities.
14Variable returns to scale (VRS) is our preferred speciﬁcation, but we also use CRS to check scale
eﬃciency.
13Model A Model B Model C Model D
Inputs
x1    







Table 2: Overview of input and output combinations in the models
heavy regulation of the service in question. Quality in the context of child care pertains
to both the endowment of each facility (equipment, furniture etc.) and the ability to
teach children. In the literature it is argued that there is some asymmetric information
in the market for child care so that parents are not able to observe the quality of a facility
and therefore cannot diﬀerentiate between good or bad child care centers [Mocan (2007)].
Without governmental regulation, this raises the risk of a decline in care quality [Gormley
(1999)]. Due to lack of data, the factors that actually drive the quality of a facility have
so far only been investigated for child care providers in the USA [Blau (1997), Blau and
Hagy (1998)]. Surprisingly these studies ﬁnd a very weak inﬂuence of such factors as
education of the personnel or the ratio of children to personnel on the human capital
accumulation of the children. Instead the socio-economic background of the parents
determines the outcome of the children. Moreover, in Germany the personnel-to-children
ratio is ﬁxed by law and the education of the personnel is comparable across the country.
In addition, the Saxon law on child care services puts further restrictions on personnel
with regard to advanced training. The endowment of the facilities can also be assumed
not to vary much between facilities as the basic needs of facilities are deﬁned in the same
state law. All these factors indicate that there are only slight quality diﬀerences between
facilities. Instead, they imply that the service quality is standardized within a narrow
band, and that the productive eﬃciency can therefore be evaluated without adherence
14to speciﬁc quality measures.
3.4. Results of the eﬃciency analysis
With the described inputs and outputs we evaluate four diﬀerent DEA speciﬁcations
(models A, B, C, and D). For all four models we compute the VRS eﬃciency scores in both
the input and output orientations. Furthermore, we test the level of scale eﬃciency using
the CRS speciﬁcation. Before selecting a speciﬁc model for the second stage regression
we discuss the results of the eﬃciency analysis in this section.
Table 3 shows the results from four diﬀerent speciﬁcations in the input orientation.
The median eﬃciency of the four speciﬁcations ranges from about 72% to 78%. The
standard deviation of the eﬃciency scores ranges from 13.1 to 15.3 points. Models A
and B contain the same number of eﬃcient units, 20, whereas models C and D deem
33 and 32 units fully eﬃcient. The percentage of eﬃcient municipalities therefore lies
between 9% and 15% of the sample. The inclusion of the facility density as an input has
a slightly larger inﬂuence on the eﬃciency than the disaggregation of the outputs with
respect to the three diﬀerent age groups. As is typical for DEAs, the eﬃciency rises the
more variables are included in the model. Considering the range of output proxies, the
variation can be deemed relatively small. The results are robust across speciﬁcations.
Model Min. Median St. Dev. Eﬃcient % eﬃcient
model A 0.449 0.717 0.138 20 9%
model B 0.356 0.730 0.153 20 13%
model C 0.481 0.778 0.131 33 15%
model D 0.371 0.783 0.146 32 15%
Table 3: Considered models: input orientation
Table 4 contains the results of the same four models in the output orientation. The
diﬀerences in the results from the input orientation are only slight. Logically the same
number of units lie on the frontier. In models B and D the minimum eﬃciencies are
smaller than those in the input orientation of the respective models. This indicates that
15there is more variation with three outputs than with one. With more outputs there may
be larger divergence from the frontier in the extreme. This is also reﬂected in the slightly
higher standard deviations in models B and D. The median eﬃciencies of all models, in
both orientations, lie within 7% points.
Model Min. Median St. Dev. Eﬃcient % eﬃcient
model A 0.465 0.749 0.136 20 9%
model B 0.261 0.758 0.150 20 13%
model C 0.485 0.772 0.139 33 15%
model D 0.261 0.786 0.156 32 15%
Table 4: Considered models: output orientation
Since it is not immediately clear whether the municipalities may choose to lower their
outputs or increase their inputs, the production process may be either input or output
oriented. To test this we run a constant returns to scale DEA for each of the four models
in both orientations.15 If the eﬃciencies are equivalent, then the orientation is irrelevant
and the municipalities can be said to be operating on an eﬃcient scale. If however a
municipality deviates from the eﬃcient frontier under either of the orientations, then
either increasing or decreasing economies of scale are present and the municipality may
be relatively more or less eﬃcient depending on the orientation.
To test scale eﬃciency we compute for each unit the ratio of its constant returns to





When CRS and VRS scores are equal a municipality is fully scale eﬃcient and receives a
score of 1. On average the municipalities are from 89% to 96% scale eﬃcient, and thus op-
erate close to constant returns to scale.16 High scale eﬃciency is to be expected, because
of the characteristic of child care services. Each addtional child requires a proportional
15The ﬁgure in appendix A depicts the diﬀerent assumptions underlying CRS and VRS.
16The scale ineﬃciency is either due to decreasing or increasing returns to scale in the individual mu-
nicipalities. We ﬁnd low deviation from constant returns to scale in either direction.
16increase in inputs (both in terms of personnel and materials). Having several smaller
facilites does not necessarily induce scale ineﬃciency at the municipal level. However we
cannot exclude that some scale eﬀects can be realized at the facility level.
Clearly there are only small diﬀerences in the minimum and median eﬃciencies be-
tween the diﬀerent speciﬁcations. In order to describe the potential diﬀerences between
the models more precisely, we compute rank correlations. We use the Spearman rank
correlation to test the correlation of the rank of individual observations in the diﬀerent
speciﬁcations. Models A and C render almost identical rankings; these models receive a
correlation of 0.85. Models B and D are also very similar; the two speciﬁcations have a
rank correlation of 0.84. The correlation between A and C respectively with B and D is
therefore slightly lower. Nonetheless, all four models are highly positively correlated.
Models A B C D
A 1
B 0.68 1
C 0.85 0.63 1
D 0.55 0.84 0.75 1
Table 5: Rank correlations between the four models in the input orientation
The orientation of the models does not alter the outcomes signiﬁcantly. Since the
economic interpretation of adjusting inputs to meet a speciﬁed level of output is more
probable in this case, we will proceed in the second stage regression using the eﬃciency
scores derived in the input orientation as the dependent variable. For the ensuing re-
gression analysis the results from Model B in the input orientation are presented. This
model contains two inputs and three outputs that capture the most important factors
with respect to eﬃciency.17
17As shown in the previous section, the alternative models deliver very similar rankings. Therefore in
speciﬁcations using one of the other three sets of eﬃciency scores as the dependent variable the results
are very similar.
174. Second stage regression
We have shown that there are diﬀerences in the technical eﬃciency of child care provi-
sion. We now proceed to explain these diﬀerences systematically making use of variables
in three broader categories: (1) variables that describe the political economy, (2) the de-
mographic composition in each municipality and (3) variables that account for the fact
that there may be competition among facilities within a municipality.
4.1. Explanatory variables
In the category of political economy, we consider the inﬂuence of the share of open-
ended grants to own tax income, the status (full-time salaried or uncompensated) of the
mayor, whether the same party remained the largest in two consecutive elections and
a Herﬁndahl index of political concentration on the eﬃciency of child care provision.
The open-grants compensate for the large economic heterogeneity among municipalities
within the state. Depending on economic power, municipalities receive these grants to
ensure suﬃcient public service provision. Since there are no restrictions on these grants
with regard to investment decisions, it is possible that ﬁnancial aid is not fully used to
adjust expenditures to local needs (e.g. to adapt local expenditures to shocks, such as
demographic change). The eﬀect of such grants on municipal expenditure ineﬃciency
is analyzed by Kalb (2008). He ﬁnds that in the provision of county roads in the state
of Baden-Württemberg in southern Germany, higher intergovernmental grants typically
lead to higher ineﬃciency (ﬂypaper eﬀect). Similar results are obtained by Silkman and
Young (1982) and De Borger and Kerstens (1996).
Hypothesis 1: A larger share of grants increases ineﬃciency.
The second political variable is a dummy variable which takes the value ”0” if a mu-
nicipality has a full-time salaried mayor. Municipalities are required by law to have a
full-time salaried mayor if their population exceeds 5000. If the population is smaller,
18the municipality is free to choose between a salaried and an uncompensated mayor. In
Saxony, two-thirds of all municipalities have fewer than 5000 inhabitants.18 Therefore
the smaller municipalities are encouraged to form ”administrative collectives” through
which even smaller municipalities may share a full-time salaried mayor. Economic liter-
ature discusses the inﬂuence of the status of a municipality’s mayor on expenditure eﬃ-
ciency [Deno and Mehay (1987), Hayes and Chang (1990), Stumm and Corrigan (1998)].
Usually, full-time salaried mayors may be more qualiﬁed, e.g. have degrees in business
administration or experience in politics. Thus municipalities with a full-time salaried
mayor are expected to be more eﬃcient.
Hypothesis 2: Having an uncompensated mayor increases ineﬃciency.
Our third variable related to local politics is ruling party stability. We deﬁne a munic-
ipality as stable if the same party gained the largest share of votes in the two consecutive
local elections in 1999 and 2004. If the same party remains in oﬃce the dummy variable
takes on the value ”0” and if a change in power took place, then the dummy variable takes
on the value ”1”. We assume that a municipality in which frequent changes take place is
more ineﬃcient than one with a stable majority, because remaining in power allows the
parties to follow their given agenda for a longer term. When changes are frequent short
term adjustments may take place which may cause wasteful spending.
Hypothesis 3: A change in the ruling coalition decreases ineﬃciency.
The ﬁnal political variable is a Herﬁndahl index of political fragmentation. The index






18In our sample almost 48% of the municipalities.
19where p is the sum of the squared share of votes the parties received.19 A high index
value is indicative of strong leadership. A high political concentration implies low po-
litical fragmentation. High fragmentation has been shown to increase expenditures and
deﬁcits, whereas more concentration leads to lower spending [Ashworth et al. (2005),
Roubini and Sachs (1989) and Roubini et al. (1989)].
Hypothesis 4: More political concentration increases ineﬃciency.
Another factor which is likely to inﬂuence eﬃciency of child care provision is the on-
going demographic changes. Almost all municipalities in Saxony already face a declining
population and this development will continue during the next decade [State Oﬃce of
Statistics of Saxony (2008a)]. Nevertheless, there is again strong heterogeneity: in the
period 2005 to 2020 some municipalities will lose about one quarter of their population,
whereas others will remain almost constant. The rate at which this population change
occurs may inﬂuence the level of eﬃciency in child care provision. On the one hand, a
decrease in the number of children attending child care facilities will immediately cause
an increase in ineﬃciency if capacities are not adjusted. However, due to ﬁxed costs this
may not be possible in the short run (e.g. ﬁnancing the building). On the other hand,
an increase in the number of children should decrease ineﬃciency as more children are
cared for given the existing capacities. Therefore we include the change in the age group
of 0 to 10 year olds from 2000 to 2006 as an explanatory variable. Since 80% of the
municipalities in our sample experienced growth in the number of under 10 year olds in
the years 2000 to 2006, we expect this variable to lower ineﬃciency.
Hypothesis 5: Population growth decreases ineﬃciency.
To capture an additional demographic aspect, we also use the share of people over 65
in relation to the total population in 2006. This is not only a demographic but also a
19Independent candidates are collected in one category.
20politico-economic variable. Since an increasing share of elderly implies that the median-
voter gets older and thus interests in ﬁnancing child care facilities decrease. Therefore
less funding is made available to ﬁnance child care services and the eﬃciency of child
care provision is expected to increase [Epple and Romano (1996), Gouveia (1997)].20
Hypothesis 6: An increase in the share of over 65 year olds decreases ineﬃciency.
Finally we use two variables to analyze whether there is competition in the provision of
child care. First, we include the number of facilities operating in a municipality through
the variable deﬁned as ”facilities per 1000 inhabitants”. Due to potential economies of
scale at the facility level, this variable should have a negative inﬂuence on eﬃciency at
the municipality level. It is less eﬃcient to operate more facilities.
Hypothesis 7: More child care centers increases ineﬃciency.
Second, we consider the transfers the municipalities make to Type II providers. The
Type II (non-proﬁt) providers are a potential source of competition for the Type I (fully
public) centers within municipalities. When transfers are made administrative costs ac-
crue, which lowers eﬃciency. Additionally when parents have a choice between diﬀerent
types of facilities, the facilities may have an incentive to spend ineﬃcient amounts to
remain attractive.
Hypothesis 8: The presence of transfers to Type II providers increases ineﬃciency.
Table 6 summarizes the above variables and their expected inﬂuence on day care eﬃ-
ciency. Table 7 contains the summary statistics of the explanatory variables used in the
second stage regression.
20Simultaneously, a large share of elderly implies a smaller inﬂuence of younger cohorts (potential par-
ents) on political outcomes.
21Category Variable description Expected inﬂuence
Ratio of grants to tax income +
Political economy Uncompensated mayor dummy +
Ruling party stability +
Party concentration -
Change in under 10 year olds -
Demography Share in over 65 year olds -
Facilities per 1000 inhabitants +
Competition Transfers to non-proﬁt +
Table 6: Variable description and expected inﬂuence on ineﬃciency
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min. Max.
Ratio of grants to tax income 1.24 0.73 0 2.99
Uncompensated mayor dummy 0.29 0.45 0 1
Ruling party stability 0.12 0.32 0 1
Party concentration 0.39 0.09 0.24 0.71
Change in under 10 year olds 37.59 68.27 - 322 378
Share of over 65 year olds 0.22 0.03 0.14 0.30
Facilities per 1000 inhabitants 0.87 0.36 0.34 2.38
Transfers to non-proﬁt 10241.04 44167.89 0 43027
Table 7: Summary statistics of environmental variables
4.2. Estimation results
Table 8 shows the coeﬃcients (bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses) of the trun-
cated regression. The dependent variable is the eﬃciency score of Model B in the input
orientation computed in section 3.4. Since the inverse of the eﬃciency scores was used
as the dependent variable a negative sign is interpreted as reducing ineﬃciency (or in-
creasing eﬃciency).
The coeﬃcients of an uncompensated mayor, the change in the number of under 10
year olds, the share of over 65 year olds and the number of facilities are statistically sig-
niﬁcant. All else held equal, having a uncompensated mayor increases ineﬃciency in the
provision of child care services by 13.5% compared to having a full-time salaried mayor.
Although the state encourages cooperation among smaller municipalities to support them
in installing a professional mayor, many municipalities still retain their uncompensated
22Variable Model B
Ratio of grants to tax income 0.036
(0.046)
Uncompensated mayor dummy 0.135*
(0.077)




Change in under 10 year olds -0.002*
(0.001)
Share of over 65 year olds 4.648**
(1.536)
Facilities per 1000 inhabitants 0.351**
(0.126)







Note: N=193. Bootstrap corrected standard errors in parentheses.
** (*) denotes a 5% (10%) level of signiﬁcance.
Table 8: Truncated regression results
mayors. Still the smaller municipalities with uncompensated mayors are relatively inef-
ﬁcient.
A larger share of elderly population inﬂuences the ineﬃciency positively. Our hypoth-
esis that municipalities with more elderly are more eﬃcient in the provision of is not
corroborated. When a municipality is relatively old, it tends to spend excessively on
child care provision. An argument follows Montén and Thum (2010) who ﬁnd that ag-
ing municipalities may have an incentive to have ineﬃciently high public spending for
the young when the municipalities engage in ﬁscal competition over the more mobile
younger population group. When this is the case a large enough share of elderly can
have a negative impact on the eﬃciency of child care provision.
23The number of facilities has a positive impact on ineﬃciency. One argument for having
many facilities is that a low population density leads to costly accessibility and therefore
justiﬁes operating more facilities. However, in Saxony municipalities are relatively small
and the distance to the facilities plays a subordinate role. Higher eﬃciency can thus
be achieved with fewer facilities. A one point increase in facilities per 1000 increases
eﬃciency by a whole 35.1%. This means that the municipality with the mean 0.87
facilities per 1000 inhabitants, would be about 19% more ineﬃcient than the municipality
with the minimum of 0.34 facilities per 1000, all else being equal.
The variable on the change in the number of 10 year olds has a negative inﬂuence on
ineﬃciency. As expected, we do not ﬁnd that additional adjustment costs accrue when
services have to be expanded. Since both the coeﬃcient (-0.002) and the change in the
number of children are relatively small, the eﬃciency gains are moderate. For the mean
municipality that gained 40 children over the 7 year period, this implies an eﬃciency
increase of 8%. Given the legally deﬁned personnel constraints our results show that
more children can be cared for without increasing costs or reducing the quality of the
care. This implies that in the past, when there were fewer children, excess capacities in
child care must have existed. When in the future fewer children require care the capacities
should be scaled back to meet the demand. The results show that municipalities are able
to adjust to an expansion relatively ﬂexibly, however we cannot show the eﬀects of a
contraction. It is probable that a downward adjustment would increase the costs per
child.
In light of the insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient on the share of grants, we ﬁnd no support for
the ﬂypaper eﬀect. The size of open ended grants a municipality receives does not
inﬂuence the eﬃciency of child care provision. We interpret this result positively, as
municipalities rather adjusting the supply of child care, than to channeling additional
resources from state grants to cover over sized provision. The positive but insigniﬁcant
inﬂuence of transfers to Type II (non-proﬁt) facilities indicates that municipalities that
24transfer funds to Type II (non-proﬁt) providers use the given resources less eﬃciently
than municipalities that provide the service internally. One explanation may be that
administrative costs reduce the eﬀectiveness of transfer payments. Another reason may
be that child care facilities of diﬀerent types compete to convince the parents to choose
their facility. Thus, in this case, competition would lead to higher expenditures, which
could be interpreted by the parents as a quality signal. Furthermore, we do not ﬁnd
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects of the two remaining political variables.
5. Discussion and policy implications
We have analyzed the eﬃciency of municipalities in the provision of child care services.
Speciﬁcally we used data on the municipalities in the Free State of Saxony in Germany.
We employed a two-stage analysis in which we ﬁrst computed the eﬃciency scores using
the non-parametric DEA method, and in a second stage we regressed the eﬃciency scores
in a truncated regression. From a policy perspective it is reasonable to assume that the
production process follows an input orientation. The expenditures are adjusted to the
number of oﬀered places, and not vice versa.
We identiﬁed diﬀerences in eﬃciency of the provision of public child care services.
We ﬁnd for the median municipality eﬃciency reserves of up to 30%. Diﬀerent model
speciﬁcations render similar eﬃciency scores, which supports the choice of the inputs
and outputs. Scale eﬃciency at the municipal level is very high in all speciﬁcations (89-
96%). The non-existence of returns to scale makes adjustment to changes in demand
relatively ﬂexible in this category. Moreover the positive inﬂuence of the number of
facilities on ineﬃciency suggests that scale eﬀects may instead be realized at the facility
level. A municipality may be justiﬁed in maintaining many facilities if at the facility level
suﬃcient scale eﬀects are realized through specialization (e.g. age groups or proﬁle).
The fact that the change in the number of under 10 year olds has a negative inﬂuence
on ineﬃciency (positive inﬂuence on eﬃciency), is an indicator of the good adaptability
25in the provision of child care services (at least when capacities are expanded). This
assertion is further corroborated by the insigniﬁcant inﬂuence of the share of matching
grants. The municipalities seem to operate child care independent of the size of matching
grants.
The demographic composition also inﬂuences eﬃciency. That aging municipalities over
spend on family friendliness ﬁnds support in these results. In order to remain attractive
to families with children, aging municipalities have an incentive to spend more on child
care. A generous provision of child care is important in the location choice for families,
in particular for those in which both parents are active in the labor market. Conversely
these families contribute revenue to the municipalities through taxation.
Professionalism in administration is important. This aspect is particularly relevant
in a state where many small municipalities are struggling with adverse demographic
developments and dwindling resources. By encouraging cooperation and professionalizing
administration, more appropriate expenditure decisions can be achieved at the local level.
In terms of municipal amalgamation our results imply that child care is not an area in
which cost savings can be achieved. However, the expenditures on child care are also not
expected to rise when two municipalities merge. Therefore, if savings can be realized in
other service areas then such a venture is beneﬁcial.
In the future, an investigation of the facility level could complement our analysis.
Although the municipalities are in charge of ﬁnancing this service, a closer consideration
of the facilities in selected municipalities could render more evidence with respect to
competition and scale eﬀects. Here we may only surmise what is happening at the facility
level. However, due to lacking data a more detailed analysis is not feasible yet. Facilities
in selected municipalities could be surveyed to conduct such a detailed evaluation. Due
to data restrictions the analysis here is limited to a cross section. With the expansion
of the supply of public child care in Germany the availability of more comprehensive
statistics is also intended. In the following years, the statistics on child care centers are
26to be published annually and in more detail. This will allow for more detailed analyses
in the future, and the incorporation of panel analyses and the monitoring of eﬃciency
developments over time.
Acknowledgements: We are grateful to participants at seminars in Lodz, Munich,
Berlin and Dresden for very useful suggestions.
27Appendix
A. Returns to scale
Figure 1 depicts the CRS and VRS frontiers for the one input one output case. The
input x is on the horizontal axis and the output y is on the vertical axis. The solid line
forms the variable returns to scale (VRS) frontier, according to which units A, B, and
C are eﬃcient, and D is ineﬃcient. The additional points depict additional ineﬃcient
units. The dashed line depicts the constant returns to scale (CRS) frontier which is a
ray from the origin, and only deems one unit, namely B as fully eﬃcient. The increasing
and decreasing returns to scale are therefore computed as the the diﬀerences between
the two frontiers. In the section ”below” unit B (not including point B) units can realize
increasing returns to scale, whereas units operating ”above” unit B (not including point
B) in terms of output operate under decreasing returns to scale.
Figure 1: Returns to scale
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